(Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to Review Targeted Attacks on United States Citizens by Bower, Daniel
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Volume 14 Issue 2 Article 3 
1-1-2014 
(Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to Review Targeted 
Attacks on United States Citizens 
Daniel Bower 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel Bower, (Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to Review Targeted Attacks on United States 
Citizens, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. Law 71 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol14/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized 






(Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to Review  
Targeted Attacks on United States Citizens 
 
Daniel Bower* 
Table of Contents 
Introduction	  ..........................................................................................................................................	  71	  
I. Opponents and Supporters of the TARC	  ...................................................................................	  73	  
II. Foundational Material	  ...................................................................................................................	  74	  
A.	  Recent	  Developments	  in	  Targeted	  Killing	  Strategy	  ...............................................................................	  74	  
B.	  The	  Implications	  of	  the	  DOJ	  White	  Paper	  ................................................................................................	  78	  
C.	  The	  Legality	  of	  Targeted	  Killing	  Under	  International	  Law	  ..................................................................	  80	  
III. Comparison To Similar Foreign Legislation	  ..........................................................................	  81	  
IV. Comparison to Enacted Domestic Law	  ....................................................................................	  82	  
A.	  Comparing	  the	  FISC	  to	  the	  TARC	  ..............................................................................................................	  82	  
B.	  Criticisms	  of	  FISA	  ........................................................................................................................................	  85	  
V. The Implementation of the TARC	  ..............................................................................................	  86	  
A.	  The	  Limited	  Scope	  of	  the	  TARC’S	  Authority	  ............................................................................................	  86	  
B.	  Who	  Judges	  the	  Targeted	  Attack	  Decisions	  ............................................................................................	  87	  
C.	  Who	  Represents	  the	  Plaintiff	  .....................................................................................................................	  88	  
D.	  When	  A	  Claim	  Becomes	  Actionable	  ..........................................................................................................	  90	  
E.	  Standard	  Of	  Review	  Used	  by	  the	  TARC	  ....................................................................................................	  94	  
F.	  What	  Factors	  the	  TARC	  Should	  Consider	  ................................................................................................	  95	  
G.	  Penalties	  to	  be	  Imposed	  by	  the	  TARC	  .......................................................................................................	  97	  
H.	  Appeal	  Process	  for	  TARC	  Decisions	  ..........................................................................................................	  98	  
VI. Additional Clarifications	  ..........................................................................................................	  100	  
A.	  Concerns	  Regarding	  the	  Right	  to	  Due	  Process	  .....................................................................................	  100	  
B.	  Shifting	  Control	  of	  Targeted	  Killing	  Decisions	  .....................................................................................	  102	  
VII. Criticisms of Targeted Attack Review	  .................................................................................	  104	  
Concluding Remarks	  ........................................................................................................................	  106	  

71 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
(Start to) Look Out Below!: Creating a Court to 
Review  






"Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great 
importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But 
it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values 
that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American 
citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments 
that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; 
and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at 
home to the principles for which we fight abroad."1 
 
On March 22, 2013, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. 
wrote a letter to the members of Congress acknowledging that four 
American citizens have been killed through the use of targeted 
killing procedures since the War on Terror began.2 The legality of 
the targeting killing procedures used by the United States has 
                                                
* Daniel Bower earned his Juris Doctor and Certificates in Labor & 
Employment Law and International & Comparative Law from 
the Chicago-Kent College of Law. He also graduated from Ohio 
University with a Bachelor of Business Administration, cum laude, 
in Finance and Business Economics with a minor in Political 
Science. 
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004). 
2 N.Y. TIMES, Holder Letter on Counterterror Strikes Against U.S. 
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recently come to the forefront of political discussions around the 
world. “At the heart of the debate are questions relating to Executive 
powers during wartime” and “whether and to what extent the CIA, an 
intelligence agency that functions in secret with far less public and 
Congressional oversight than the armed forces, should be conducting 
operations using lethal force.”3 In addition, concerns have arisen 
regarding “the criteria for targeting and killing individuals, including 
U.S. citizens, the existence of substantive or procedural safeguards to 
ensure accuracy and legitimacy of killings, and the existence of 
accountability mechanisms.”4  
After acknowledging the existence of a targeted killing 
program on numerous occasions, the Obama administration received 
increased pressure from members of Congress to explain its stance 
and legal rationale behind its decision to target and kill American 
citizens.5 “Targeted killing” refers to premeditated acts of lethal 
force employed by states to kill specific individuals who are not in 
custody, and often, difficult to get into custody. 6  Drone-based 
targeting killing, which is a common way to conduct these 
operations, “refers to the use of ‘drones,’ or unmanned aerial 
vehicles that are remotely piloted or run autonomously, to remotely 
launch missile strikes for targeted killing.”7  
This article will not focus on the legality of targeted killings 
in either domestic or international law. That is an entirely separate 
                                                
3 Brief for the Bureau of Investigative Journalism et. al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 4, Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Central Intelligence Agency, No. 11-5320 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 22, 2012), 
2012 WL 978169 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae]. 
4 Id. at 5-6. 
5 Michael D. Shear and Scott Shane, Congress to See Memo Backing 
Drone Attacks on Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/politics/obama-orders-
release-of-drone-memos-to-lawmakers.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
6 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 3, at 8. 
7 Id. 
 
73 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
topic. This article assumes that in general, the use of targeted killing 
is legal. The focus of this article will be advocating for 
implementation of a review process to ensure the legitimacy of 
Government-sanctioned targeted killings of specific individuals. 
The thesis of this article is that the United States Congress 
can and should pass legislation implementing post facto review of 
targeted killing decisions in order to create a safeguard against 
unquestioned, Government-sanctioned attacks on American citizens. 
For purposes of this article, the court that would hear these cases is 
titled the “Targeted Attack Review Court” or “TARC”.  
This article can be used as a starting point for legislators 
wishing to implement a review process for the Government’s 
targeted killing program. It will focus on what procedures would 
make the TARC most effective and most likely to find support with 
members of Congress, defense officials, and U.S. courts. 
 
I. Opponents and Supporters of the TARC 
 
The CIA and other intelligence and defense officials will 
likely not support such legislation. Very few people want their 
decisions questioned, and that is precisely the aim of the TARC.  
However, the creation of a TARC already has potential 
support in Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, head of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, stated that she would consider 
proposals to create a court overseeing targeted killing procedures, 
analogous to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 8  The 
TARC would also likely see support from Senator Rand Paul, who 
engaged in a widely publicized filibuster on March 6, 2013 
                                                
8 Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, Drones Are Focus as C.I.A. 
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concerning the ambiguities of the Obama administration’s drone 
policy.9  
Other Libertarian Congressman, as well as many Democrats 
and Socially Liberal Republicans, would likely support this proposed 
legislation as well, especially since favorable public opinion on the 
Government’s antiterrorism efforts is quickly diminishing. For the 
first time in American history, the People no longer believe that the 
Government is properly balancing security and individual rights.10 
 
II. Foundational Material 
 
A. Recent Developments in Targeted Killing Strategy 
 
In February 2013, President Obama acknowledged the existence 
of America’s targeted killing program while discussing the death of a 
U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki.11 Anwar al-Awlaki was the first U.S. 
Citizen to be placed on a list of suspected terrorists that the CIA had 
authorized to kill.12 What is even more disconcerting is that President 
                                                
9 Sadia Ahsanuddin, Rand Paul filibusters the domestic drone, AL 
JAZEERA, Mar. 12, 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/03/20133911444231
4519.html. 
10 WASHINGTON POST, Washington Post Poll, 
http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_20130418.html (last visited Mar. 
16, 2014). In an April 2013 survey of 588 adults, when asked what 
worried them more, 41% of people feared the Government would not 
go far enough in investigating alleged terrorists, while 48% of people 
said they feared the Government would go too far in compromising 
Constitutional rights while investigating alleged terrorists. 
11 Mazzetti, supra note 8. 
12 Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of American Cleric, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/world/middleeast/07yemen.htm
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Obama approved that decision; the President of the United States 
approved the decision to kill a U.S. citizen without his guilt being 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.13   
Anwar al-Awlaki was what the Government deemed a radical 
cleric, who was killed in a September 30, 2011 drone strike in 
Yemen.14  
 
“During his presidential campaign, Republican Rep. 
Ron Paul criticized the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, 
saying: ‘Al-Awlaki was born here, he is an American 
citizen. He was never tried or charged for any crimes. 
No one knows if he killed anybody. ... But if the 
American people accept this blindly and casually that 
we now have an accepted practice of the president 
assassinating people who he thinks are bad guys, I 
think it's sad.’”15 
 
However, what really made the story of Anwar al-Awlaki’s 
death a headline was that the drone strike ordered just weeks later 
caused death of his 16 year-old son: Abdulrahman al-Awlaki.16 A 
                                                                                                             
l; Tom Leonard, Barack Obama orders killing of US cleric Anwar al-
Awlaki, THE TELEGRAPH, April 7, 2010, http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/7564581/Barack-
Obama-orders-killing-of-US-cleric-Anwar-al-Awlaki.html. 
13 Shane, supra note 12; Leonard, supra note 12. 
14 BBC NEWS, Islamist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen, Sept. 
30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15121879. 
15 Andrew Rafferty, American drone deaths highlight controversy, 
NBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2013, 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05/16856963-american-
drone-deaths-highlight-controversy?lite. 
16 Sabrina Siddiqui, Obama ‘Surprised,’ ‘Upset’ When Anwar Al-
Awlaki’s Teenage Son Was Killed By U.S. Drone Strike, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, April 24, 2013, http://www. 
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strike that a White House official deemed “a mistake, a bad 
mistake.”17 Abdulrahman was also an American citizen, and had no 
ties to any terrorist organizations.18 His family alleged that he was 
targeted simply because he was the son of Anwar al-Awlaki.19 
Sources have stated that the Government has many “kill lists” 
filled with counterterrorism targets, one of which is maintained by 
the CIA.20 The CIA and other agency analysts prepare this “kill 
list.”21 CIA lawyers then determine whether or not to place someone 
on the “kill list” based on whether or not that person poses a direct 
threat to the United States.22 The CIA then gives the final approval 
for a strike.23 The Government conducts strikes on both specific 
known individuals, and on unknown targets believed to be terror 
suspects.24  
What is truly astonishing is that “[b]etween 1,990 and 3,308 
people are reported to have been killed in the drone strikes in 
Pakistan since 2004, the vast majority of them during the Obama 
terms.” 25  Although most Americans like to believe that these 






20 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 3, at 23; Ken Dilanian, U.S. Put 
New Restrictions on CIA Drone Strikes in Pakistan, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/ 
07/world/la-fg-cia-drones-20111108. 
21 Brief of Amici Curiae supra note 3, at 24.    
22 Id. at 25. 
23 Id. at 24. 
24 Dilanian, supra note 20. 
25 RT NEWS, Leaked report: Nearly half of US drone strikes in 
Pakistan not against al-Qaeda, April 12, 2013, 
http://rt.com/news/drones-us-al-qaeda-militants-649/. 
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operations are focused exclusively on high-level suspects and that 
there are no civilian casualties, this is not the case.26  
In the 12-month period up to 2011, forty-three out of ninety-
five reported drone strikes were not aimed at al-Qaeda at all.27 While 
265 out of 482 people killed during targeted attacks were defined by 
the Government as ‘extremists’, only six of the men killed, less than 
two percent, were senior al-Qaeda leaders.”28  
Some of those killed “appear to have been simply errors, with 
the victims branded as terrorists only after the fact.”29 And even 
more alarming, is that documents "show that drone operators weren't 
always certain who they were killing."30 These shocking statistics are 
why the TARC is necessary in today’s War on Terror.  
Moreover, while the focus of the TARC is on protecting the 
lives of U.S. citizens, the TARC’s deterrence goals relating to 
“shooting before aiming” may save the lives of a number of 
individuals who are not U.S. citizens. Thus, the protection of 
potentially innocent U.S. lives may have a spillover effect that 






                                                
26 Conor Friedersdorf, New Evidence That Team Obama Misled Us 
About the Drones, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 10, 2013, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/04/new-evidence-
that-team-obama-misled-us-about-the-drone-war/274839/ (stating 
that a review of classified documents demonstrates that “al-Qaeda 
members were a minority of people killed by drones, and killing 
senior al-Qaeda leaders was rare.”). 
27 RT NEWS, supra note 25. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Friedersdorf, supra note 26.  
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B. The Implications of the DOJ White Paper 
 
On February 4, 2013, NBC News released a Department of 
Justice White Paper, titled: “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation 
Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader 
of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force.”31 The document explains the 
legal basis for the Government’s targeted killing program.32 “The 
memo was given confidentially to members of the Senate 
Intelligence and Judiciary committees by the administration last 
June,” according to a statement released by Sen. Dianne Feinstein.33 
It is important to keep in mind that the memo is a policy paper, not 
an official legal document.34 The assertion being made in the White 
Paper is that the: 
 
“United States would be able to use lethal force 
against a U.S. citizen, who is located outside the 
United States and is an operational leader continually 
planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in 
at least the following circumstances: (1) where an 
informed, high-level official of the U.S. government 
has determined that the targeted individual poses an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United 
States; (2) where a capture operation would be 
infeasible and where those conducting the operation 
                                                
31 Michael Isikoff, Justice Department memo reveals legal case for 





33 Pam Benson, Memo backs U.S. using lethal force against 
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continue to monitor whether capture becomes 
feasible; and (3) where such an operation would be 
conducted consistent with applicable law of war 
principles.”35  
 
Moreover, the framework discussed in the DOJ White Paper 
is remarkably similar to President Obama’s stance on the issue.  
 
“The administration has said that strikes by the CIA's 
missile-firing Predator and Reaper drones are 
authorized only against ‘specific senior operational 
leaders of al Qaida and associated forces’ involved in 
the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks who are plotting 
‘imminent’ violent attacks on Americans. ‘It has to be 
a threat that is serious and not speculative,’ President 
Barack Obama said in a Sept. 6, 2012, interview with 
CNN. ‘It has to be a situation in which we can't 
capture the individual before they move forward on 
some sort of operational plot against the United 
States.’”36 
 
The other important aspect of the White Paper is the legal 
foundation discussed in the 16-page memo.37 First, the memo states 
that: “in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen 
who has joined al-Qa’ida or its associated forces would be lawful 
under U.S. and international law.”38 Second, the memo disclaims any 
liability for a targeted killing pursuant to either Title 18 or the 
assassination ban.39 Third, “[w]ere the target of a lethal operation a 
U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and 
                                                
35 Isikoff, supra note 31, at 6 of the White Paper. 
36 Friedersdorf, supra note 26. 
37 Isikoff, supra note 31, at 1-2 of the White Paper. 
38 Id. at 1 of the White Paper. 
39 Id. 
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the Fourth Amendment, that individual’s citizenship would not 
immunize him from a lethal operation.”40  
Again, the purpose of this article is not to debate the legality 
of targeting a U.S. citizen. The reference to the DOJ White Paper is 
simply to add further foundation to the relevance of the topic at 
issue, especially since the Obama administration has taken a 
remarkably similar stance. Assuming it is true that it is legal to target 
and kill a U.S. citizen engaged with a terrorist organization in an 
attempt to attack the United States, then there must be some sort of 
review of the decision to target those individuals.  
 
C. The Legality of Targeted Killing Under International Law 
  
As stated above, this article is not meant to analyze the 
legality of targeting killing. The purpose of this article is strictly to 
focus on what can be done to minimize the loss of innocent lives, 
given that the procedure exists. Regardless, a brief examination of 
the legality of targeted attacks under international law is relevant for 
foundational purposes. 
Pursuant to the Geneva Conventions Common Article 2 
international armed conflicts, both lawful and unlawful combatants 
may be targeted.41 And, under Common Article 3 non-international 
armed conflicts, individuals may be targeted if they are positively 
identified armed individuals taking active part in hostilities. 42 
However, Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3, which is generally 
considered customary international law, appears to prohibit targeted 
                                                
40 Id. at 2 of the White Paper (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 532 (2004)). 
41 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 
art. 2, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
42 Id. at art. 3. 
 
81 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
killing in international armed conflicts until a civilian takes direct 
part in hostilities.43  
It is evident that the issue of the legality of targeted killing 
procedures is yet to be resolved. What is important to remember is 
that for the purpose of this article, the use of targeted killings in 
general is presumed to be legal, but each individual attack may not 
be legal. 
 
III. Comparison To Similar Foreign Legislation 
 
Other States already support similar legislation: 
 
“[The Israeli Supreme Court] has developed limits on 
targeted killing through a mix of IHL and human 
rights law. These limits include: (1) independent, ex 
post investigation by executive authorities ‘regarding 
the precision of the identification of the target and the 
circumstances of the attack,’ and, even more 
remarkable from a U.S. perspective; (2) independent 
judicial review of those executive investigations.”44  
 
                                                
43 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), art. 51.3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. However, the 
United States is not a party to Additional Protocol I, so it is not 
bound by its terms. 
44 Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Measure Twice, Shoot 
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 
1233 (2011) (citing HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. 
v. Gov't of Isr. (PCATI) [Dec. 11, 2005], slip op. [hereinafter 
PCATI], which at paragraph 40 requires objective, ex post executive 
review, and at paragraph 54 requires judicial review of ex post 
executive review in "appropriate cases"). 
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The Israeli Supreme Court relied on two European Court of Human 
Rights cases in making these determinations.45  
The ECHR stated that there should be an official 
investigation when individuals have been killed by the State in order 
to determine whether deadly force was justified, and if it was not, to 
hold those involved responsible.46 The Israel Supreme Court also 
recognized that ex post executive review by the judiciary was 
necessary in this context, with deference given to military officials 
acting in their official capacity.47 Finally, when it comes to who 
reviews targeted killing decisions, “[t]he Israelis rely on a mix of 
executive and judicial actors.”48  
These cases add further support to the feasibility of the 
implementation of the TARC. The goals and standards discussed 
above are strikingly similar to those of the TARC and will be 
discussed at length in the rest of the article. 
 
IV. Comparison to Enacted Domestic Law 
 
A. Comparing the FISC to the TARC 
 
The United States’ creation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) through the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) is comparable to the creation of the TARC. 
In enacting FISA in 1978,  
 
“Congress authorized judges of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve 
                                                
45 Id. (citing McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, ¶¶ 
161-63 (1995) and McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
553, 559 (2001)). 
46 Id. at 1234 (citing McCann, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 161). 
47 Id. (citing PCATI, supra note 44, at ¶¶ 56-57). 
48 Id. at 1236.  
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electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
purposes if there is probable cause to believe ‘that the 
target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power’ and that each of the 
specific ‘facilities or places at which the electronic 
surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be 
used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power.’”49   
 
 After September 11th, President Bush authorized the NSA to 
conduct warrantless wiretapping of communications where one party 
was located outside the U.S. and a participant was reasonably 
believed to be a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist 
organization. 50 “[T]he FISC issued orders authorizing the 
Government to target international communications into or out of the 
United States where there was probable cause to believe that one 
participant to the communication was a member or agent of al-Qaeda 
or an associated terrorist organization.”51  
 FISC approval is contingent upon the Government showing 
that “minimization” procedures are in place.52 This means that the 
invasiveness of the inquiry is limited to the relevant parties. This 
“minimization” requirement is a key aspect for the TARC to take 
into account. Targeted killings should not be used to destroy entire 
towns and cities. 
There are a few additional key comparisons that can be drawn 
between the FISC and the TARC. First, and possibly most 
importantly, is that FISA and FISC have continually been held 
constitutional. All courts that have considered the issue, both before 
                                                
49 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
50 Id.   
51 Id. at 1144.   
52 Id. at 1145. 
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and after the enactment of the PATRIOT Act, have rejected 
constitutional challenges.53   
Second, proceedings in the TARC, like the FISC, would be 
held in camera.54 In order for the TARC to have a realistic chance of 
being supported and implemented, the in camera aspect would likely 
be a requirement. National security is always a major concern in this 
area of the law. Implementing the in camera requirement respects the 
deference given to the Government in the area of national security, 
while at the same time implementing accountability for the targeted 
killing of a U.S. citizen.  
FISA provides the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
with jurisdiction to entertain ex parte executive applications for 
electronic surveillance.55 However, the TARC courts would not be ex 
parte. In the TARC, neither the plaintiff, nor his or her witnesses, 
would be permitted to be present. Witnesses would only be allowed 
to provide affidavits advocating for the victim. For national security 
reasons, only advocates for the Government, Government witnesses, 
and the plaintiffs’ advocates would be permitted to enter the hearing 
                                                
53 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 103, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied. The court clarified that only one district court has held 
FISA unconstitutional. However, that decision was vacated by the 
Ninth Circuit in Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 
2010); see United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 337 (3rd Cir. 2011) 
(“Aligning with all of the other courts of appeals that have 
considered this issue, however, we reject defendants’ constitutional 
challenge.”). These challenges focus on due process violations and 
will be examined in greater depth in the CONCERNS REGARDING 
THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS section of this article. 
54 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803 (West Supp. 2010). 
55 Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 117.   
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challenging the Government’s decision. This strikes a fair balance 
between adequate representation and national security concerns.56 
 
B. Criticisms of FISA 
 
A major criticism of FISA is that Government officials have a 
tendency to abuse the Act in certain high-profile cases.57 Since its 
enactment, there have been accusations that FISA protocols were not 
properly followed in many cases.58 Moreover, there is evidence that 
FISA has been increasingly used to target non-terrorists.59  
This is another reason ex ante review may not be the most 
appropriate option for the TARC. If the Government requires 
permission from the TARC before acting, evidence may be more 
likely to be fabricated in order to gain approval to strike. If the 
TARC had an ex ante review system similar to FISC, it would allow 
the Government to avoid sanctions as long as the Government could 
establish that it followed proper procedure; there would be no 
substantive analysis. This is not an appropriate measure.  
Just because the Government follows a checklist does not 
mean that the actions of the Government are reasonable. The 
possibility of abuse in this area of the law is too great to not review 
the reasonableness of targeted attacks against United States citizens 
after they occur. Just as FISA has allowed the Government to violate 
the rights of the innocent, so has the Government’s unchecked 
decision-making power in the targeted killing of United States 
                                                
56 “Fair balance” as used here is what a United States court would 
likely decide was a fair balance, although human rights advocates 
may likely disagree. 
57 Christopher P. Banks, Security and Freedom After September 11: 
The Institutional Limits and Ethical Costs of Terrorism Prosecutions, 
13 PUB. INTEGRITY 5, 15 (2011). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 17. 
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citizens. This is why the TARC must review the Government’s 
decisions post facto. 
Another major criticism of FISA is that when the 
Government attempts to procure FISA warrants, the process is too 
inefficient to be truly effective due to internal legal, bureaucratic, and 
procedural problems.60 This is yet another reason ex ante review is 
not appropriate for the TARC. In times of war there may be moments 
when the Government must act with supreme expediency. Requiring 
approval to attack a major threat could seriously threaten the 
Government’s ability to defend the Nation. The Government must be 
able to act when it deems appropriate, but it must know that targeted 
attack decisions may be reviewed. While the decision to attack in the 
first place seems like the appropriate place to review this process, it 
is not the most realistic. 
 
V. The Implementation of the TARC 
 
 Now that a sufficient foundation has been laid, the article will 
now discuss the specific policies and procedures related to the 
implementation of the Targeted Attack Review Court. 
 
A. The Limited Scope of the TARC’S Authority 
 
The scope of the TARC would be limited. The public policy 
implications of such a court are obvious. In many cases, the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens may directly conflict with the 
Government’s need for deference to act as protectors of national 
security.  
The TARC is meant to act as a deterrent factor to those 
officials who have the ability to order targeted killings. As of right 
now there are little or no deterrents to ordering targeted attacks. 
Because there is no risk of the loss of American soldiers’ lives, and 
no risk that officials will be held accountable for their decisions, it is 
                                                
60 Id. 
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much easier to order an attack than what basic human rights demand. 
If nothing else, the presence of the TARC is a reason to pause and 
ensure that enough evidence has been gathered to order an attack. 
Soldiers can be courts-martialled for their decision to pull the trigger 
in battle; there is no reason that a Government official’s decision to 
push the kill button should not be reviewed as well. 
The TARC would not be established in order to force the 
Government to obtain permission before it orders an attack on an 
individual. The TARC would be solely responsible for hearing 
grievances post facto on behalf of those who are targeted by the U.S. 
Government. It would be tasked with deciding whether the actions of 
those officials who ordered the targeted killing were reasonable in 
light of the surrounding circumstances. The TARC would not be 
created in order to take power away from the military and 
intelligence agencies to conduct the actions they deem essential. The 
TARC’s only responsibility would be to determine whether or not 
the decision to attack was appropriate at the time the decision was 
made. And the liability decision would be strictly based on whether 
the decision at the time was reasonable. 
Finally, the TARC would only hear cases regarding attacks 
on American citizens, whether on United States or foreign soil. 
Legally and politically, there are a multitude of obvious problems 
and issues that arise when hearing the disputes of non-citizens, the 
most crucial being that in most circumstances they would not be 
subject to the protections of the United States Constitution. 
These limitations have been placed on the TARC in order to 
minimize the controversial nature of the proposed legislation. After-
the-fact review of the targeted killing of citizens is a much easier sell 
to the Government and to Congress than requiring approval of every 
single targeted attack decision regardless of who is being targeted. 
 
B. Who Judges the Targeted Attack Decisions 
 
The question of who would hear cases in the TARC is a key 
issue in this process. Ideally, the TARC would consist of a mix of 
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retired intelligence professionals, military personnel, and federal 
judges. The goal of this process is that the individuals who sit on the 
TARC would have a wealth of experience and as little stake in the 
outcome of the case as possible. For this reason, everyone on the 
TARC should be retired from the career that qualifies him or her to 
hold a position on the TARC. The TARC would consist of a mix of 
retired federal court judges, military generals, and professionals from 
the CIA, FBI, JSOC, etc. The TARC would have a rotating five-
member review committee. There would always be at least one 
member sitting on the TARC from each of the professions listed 
above: one judge, one military general, and one defense professional. 
These officials would be appointed by the President and confirmed 
by the Senate, the same way federal court judges are appointed.61  
 
C. Who Represents the Plaintiff 
  
Another major decision that must be made is who will 
represent the plaintiff in the TARC. Again, because of national 
security concerns, the plaintiffs and their witnesses will not be 
permitted in TARC hearings; only the victims’ advocates will be 
permitted in TARC hearings.  
Appropriate advocates for the victim are necessary in order 
for hearings to be fair. The most logical choice would be a JAG 
officer. This will obviously require a lot of cooperation between the 
military and government agencies, but JAG officers will be the best 
advocates for the victims of targeted attacks. JAG officers are trained 
in handling sensitive information. They are aware of the classified 
nature of information associated with military tribunals. They risk 
dishonorable discharge for disobeying the rules of military justice 
and for revealing classified information if assigned to the TARC. 
They are attorneys devoted to justice and the rights and freedoms 
associated with being a United States citizen. 
                                                
61 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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 More importantly, they are trained to analyze “compliance 
with law-of-war rules such as discrimination, proportionality, and 
necessity. Judge advocates now sit in targeting centers and provide 
real-time advice about the legality of attacking various targets.”62 
They have the expertise to represent victims that civilian attorneys do 
not possess. 
There are individuals who would likely have reservations 
about using JAG officers to represent the victims of targeted attacks 
for fear of the increasing militarization of the review process. 
However, any fear that using JAG officers would cause a conflict of 
interest is easily refuted. JAG officers represent both the Government 
and its soldiers in military tribunals on a daily basis. If these officers 
can defend soldiers against Government actions, it seems they could 
fairly and adequately represent the victims of allegedly wrongful 
targeted attacks. Furthermore, the expertise that JAG officers can 
provide in their representation of victims is unparalleled in the 
private sector. 
 Another alternative is using high-level Government 
attorneys, such as Assistant U.S. Attorneys or Federal Defenders. 
Using these attorneys would quell some of the concerns regarding 
over-militarization. However, using these attorneys would still 
require bringing civilians into the review process. It is unlikely that 
Government defense officials or members of Congress would 
support such a process. The same national security concerns that 
keep plaintiffs and their witnesses from being present at FISC 
hearings are also present here: civilians should not have access to 
classified information. Thus, civilian attorneys should not be 





                                                
62 Nathan Alexander Sales, Self-Restraint and National Security, 6 J. 
NATL. SEC. L. & POL’Y 227, 252 (2012). 
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D. When A Claim Becomes Actionable 
 
If a “kill list” exists, why is there not a review of that list? 
Obviously a large issue in this area of the law is that even if there is a 
review of a targeted attack, it may be too little too late if fatalities 
have occurred. The assertion that there should be a review of 
individuals put on a targeted “kill list” seems only logical from a 
human rights perspective.  
But again, the TARC is not meant to interfere with military 
operations; it is only meant to confirm that Government actions 
comply with international and domestic law. While one way to 
approach the issue is to review the decision to attack in the first 
place, this is likely not a realistic proposition. The need for 
immediate action during wartime will likely prevent a review of the 
decision to attack prior to the attack occurring. Again, the case law 
makes it clear that the Government is given wide latitude from which 
to operate and hold its veil of secrecy in the context of combating 
terrorism.63 While this may not sit well with many people, it is a line 
that United States courts have been very fearful of crossing. 
In addition, part of the appeal of post facto review is that 
once the alleged threat has been eliminated, the Government’s 
national security concern is somewhat diminished. Thus, the 
Government will have a harder time arguing that based on the special 
                                                
63 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 
903 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t 
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (permitting 
reliance upon secret evidence in designating a group as a terrorist 
organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (using classified information in in 
camera and ex parte proceedings to prove that a group is a terrorist 
organization did not violate due process); Global Relief Found. Inc. 
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (statute not 
unconstitutional because it authorizes the use of classified evidence 
that may be considered ex parte by the district court). 
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circumstances of war it is not able to provide more specific 
information regarding each attack.  
Furthermore, one must continue to keep United States law 
and its procedures in mind. In order for a U.S. court to hear a 
challenge to a TARC decision, Article III standing would have to be 
established, as it must with every claim brought in federal court. “To 
establish Article III standing, an injury must be concrete, 
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the 
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”64 And, 
“threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in 
fact, and that allegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient.”65  
The Clapper case, which deals with a FISC decision, 
provides a great parallel to a potential TARC case. It is obvious that 
there is a significantly different set of concerns when it comes to 
placing a wiretap on a person’s communication devices, and placing 
someone’s name on a targeted killed list. Although the Clapper case 
is not a perfect parallel, the arguments and holdings are quite 
comparable. While different standards may be more appropriate 
based on the fact that a person’s life is being put in serious jeopardy, 
the Article III standards that would allow a case to be brought based 
on the fact that a person’s name was placed on a “kill list” have yet 
to be articulated in a United States court.66 As a result, it is difficult 
to make assumptions about how a United States court would rule on 
                                                
64 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1147 (2013) 
(emphasis in original). 
65 Id. 
66 The father of Anwar al-Awlaki brought a comparable suit, but it 
was dismissed because the court found that he did not have standing 
to assert his son’s constitutional rights. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 1, 14-35 (D.D.C. 2010). However, should an individual 
actually be killed by a targeted attack, a family member, on behalf of 
the estate, could meet the Article III standing requirement. See Al-
Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014 WL 1352452 at 10 (D.D.C. April 4, 2014). 
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such an issue. Thus, the Clapper case will be used as a comparator 
because it provides the most solid legal basis for predicting the 
holdings of United States courts on the Article III standing of victims 
of targeted attacks. 
Clapper involved Section 702 of FISA, which allows the 
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire 
foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the 
surveillance of individuals who are not lawful United States residents 
and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.67 
The challengers were United States citizens whose work allegedly 
involved engaging in international communications with individuals 
whom they believed would be potential targets of surveillance under 
Section 702 of FISA.68   
The Supreme Court denied the citizens’ challenge based on 
three key, and relevant, arguments. “First, it is speculative whether 
the Government will imminently target communications to which 
respondents are parties.”69 Second, even if it could be demonstrated 
that the targeting of foreign contacts is imminent, it is mere 
speculation that the Government will use FISA authorized 
surveillance, rather than other methods, to do so.70 Third, it is unclear 
whether the Government would succeed in acquiring the 
communications.71  
These reasons exemplify why the TARC should not provide 
approval, and should merely be used as a system of review: because 
any challenges to the decision could not be heard in federal court due 
to a lack of standing.  
First, just because a person is on a “kill list” does not mean 
that an attack is imminent. An attack could occur tomorrow, or ten 
                                                
67 Clapper, 133 U.S. at 1142.   
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 1148. 
70 Id. at 1149.   
71 Id. at 1150.  
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years from today, the latter unlikely to be considered imminent. 
Second, even if a name was placed on a “kill list”, there is no way to 
know whether the Government will use a targeted attack procedure 
to complete the operation, or a clearly legal specialized alternative, 
such as sending in a SEAL team, the Army Rangers, etc. Finally, 
there is no way of knowing whether a targeted attack would be 
successful. And without an injury, there is no Article III standing. 
Although it seems illogical that placing a person’s name on a 
“kill list” should not be subject to judicial review, the claim is likely 
to be held to lack Article III standing. As a result, a review of a 
TARC decision should only be done after an attack has been 
conducted.  
If the person attacked is still alive, or if he or she is killed, his 
or her family could then fulfill Article III standing requirements for 
sustaining an injury.72 It is clear that a targeted attack could be fairly 
traceable to the Government and there would be an adequate civil 
remedy. Thus, the injury, causation, and redressability prongs would 
all be met. The victim or his or her family could then file a claim 
with the TARC, and proceedings would commence. 
However, there is a problem with this system if the victim is 
killed and he or she has no surviving family or friends to bring a 
claim. Or, the victim’s family may not know that the victim was 
killed in a targeted attack, rather than in a more traditional military 
operation. In this case, automatic review of each targeted attack 
decision seems more appropriate. While it is impractical based on 
time, resources, and the sheer number of attacks, to hold a full 
hearing to review each and every targeted attack decision, there is a 
middle ground that may be appropriate.  
The Government should be required to submit a brief report 
of each attack to the TARC. This has a similar deterrent effect as 
when law enforcement officers in the U.S. must submit to a review 
when they fire their weapon. The report could be brief, but at a 
minimum it should establish who was attacked, what their citizenship 
                                                
72 See Al-Aulaqi, 2014 WL 1352452 at 10. 
 
94 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
status was, why they were attacked, and what was done to confirm 
the identity and alleged wrongdoings of the individual.  
If the TARC deems that the decision seemed reasonable, they 
would do nothing further. However, if the TARC sees flaws in the 
report, it could decide to hold a full review hearing. Thus, targeted 
attack decisions would be reviewed if: a victim brought a claim; 
someone brought a claim on behalf of a victim; or the TARC saw 
flaws in the Government’s mandatory report. As a result, all 
decisions would be given at least some sort of review. This adds to 
the TARC’s goal of deterrence and seems appropriate with human 
life at stake. 
 
 E. Standard Of Review Used by the TARC 
  
The standard of review for the TARC should be the same as 
the standard of review for soldiers in courts-martial: was it justified? 
Article 118 of the Manual for Courts-Martial United States defines 
murder as the unlawful killing of a human being without justification 
or excuse.73 
So what is proper justification or excuse? This is where is the 
DOJ White Paper once again becomes important. If we assume that 
the DOJ correctly analyzes the legality of targeted killings, the 
TARC would have to decide if the 3-prong test laid out in the White 
Paper had been met.74 There is a one-word addition that should be 
included in the test however. This addition would be adding the word 
                                                
73 R.C.M. § 918. Art. 118. 
74 Isikoff, supra note 31, at 6 of the White Paper (“1) where an 
informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined 
that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack 
against the United States; 2) where a capture operation would be 
infeasible-and where those conducting the operation continue to 
monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and 3) where such an 
operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war 
principles.”). 
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reasonable into the first prong of this test. So the first factor would 
read: “Where an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government 
has reasonably determined that the targeted individual poses an 
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States.”75  
If the TARC determines that the Government acted 
reasonably in light of the circumstances, the burden would then shift 
to the plaintiff to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the attack 
was not reasonably justified. This is the standard used in criminal 
trials in the United States, as well as for military courts-martials, to 
establish guilt.76 Again, the burden would be on the victim, not the 
Government, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the three-
prong test had not been met. This standard gives the utmost 
deference possible to the Government to conduct its wartime 
operations, but still ensures some level of accountability. If the 
plaintiff established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government 
did not act reasonably, he or she would be entitled to damages. 
Comparing this standard with the standard of review in 
citizen-detainee cases provides support to the constitutionality of this 
standard.77 The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution would 
not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s 
evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and 
fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.” 78  Therefore, this 
standard seems the most appropriate, as well as the most likely 
standard to be approved by the Supreme Court. 
 
F. What Factors the TARC Should Consider 
  
                                                
75 Id. (emphasis added). 
76 R.C.M. § 851. Art. 51. 
77 This comparison will be analyzed under the CONCERNS 
REGARDING THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS section of this 
article. 
78 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004). 
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The factors that the TARC should consider will be largely 
determined by the expertise of those who are appointed to review the 
targeted attack decisions. These appointees would be best able to 
determine whether or not the actions of the Government were 
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
 What must be decided is how serious of a threat the 
individual allegedly posed, the likelihood that he or she could have 
been captured, and whether or not the Government complied with 
law of war principles. The DOJ White Paper is again relevant here. 
The DOJ White Paper framework provides a solid basis from which 
decisions could be reviewed, and it is an appropriate standard for the 
TARC to use in its future analysis. 
Some of the specific factors the TARC should consider 
include: what evidence was gathered; the availability of evidence; 
whether more evidence could have been obtained; the reliability of 
the evidence that was gathered; and whether that evidence was, or 
could have been, corroborated. 
 More key issues to be decided are: where in the chain of 
command the accuracy of the decision-making process began to 
breakdown, and how far down, or up, the chain of command fault 
should lie? Who gathered evidence, if any? Who is responsible for 
poor intelligence and misreported or misinterpreted information? 
Should the penalty only be imposed on the final decision-maker or 
should his or her subordinates also be punished?  
This is one of the points where the limits of lay opinion 
become obvious. While it is easy to speculate on what is reasonable 
from a computer chair, those with actual experience combating 
terrorism will best be able to determine when a decision needed to be 
made, what evidence was necessary to make that decision, and who 
should be held responsible. This degree of deference places a lot of 
faith in those who sit on the TARC. But in light of the fact that it will 
be extremely difficult for lay people to adequately answer these 




97 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
G. Penalties to be Imposed by the TARC 
 
If the TARC finds that a killing was not justified, what should 
happen? First and foremost victims or their families need to be 
compensated. A civil penalty should be imposed by the TARC if it 
finds that the Government unlawfully conducted a targeted attack 
against a U.S. citizen. This provision could be written into the 
legislation. If the TARC finds that the Government has unlawfully 
attacked a citizen, an automatic payment would be made to the 
victim or his or her family. The amount to be paid out for individual 
injuries would to be determined by Congress. Victims who are not 
killed, but who the TARC determines to have been wrongfully 
attacked, would be paid an amount determined by the TARC on a 
case-by-case basis. This money would come from an account that the 
Government establishes. This requirement should also be mandated 
in the legislation. 
When it comes to individual decision-makers, the 
justifications for imposing a criminal penalty are obvious: the 
Government has either just committed murder or attempted murder 
of a citizen. The person who ordered that decision committed that 
crime. However, putting a person in prison for committing what he 
or she believed to be an appropriate action in their duty to protect 
American lives seems both controversial, and possibly too extreme. 
As a result, criminal penalties should not be imposed by the TARC.  
Civil penalties against individual actors would seem more 
appropriate. But, it is unlikely that individual Government officials 
would have sufficient funds to compensate victims. As a result, 
individual Government officials would not be required to pay out 
damages; payments would come exclusively from the above-
mentioned account.79  
                                                
79 This is similar to U.S. employment law where the company pays 
for damages arising out of an employee’s mistake during the course 
of his or her employment. 
 
98 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
 
 
The more appropriate punishment for individual actors would 
be demotion or termination from their Government position. Again, 
the appropriate punishment would be determined by the TARC. 
Termination is obviously a serious penalty, but in light of the 
responsibility entrusted to individuals to command United States war 
efforts, it may be appropriate. If a Government official makes a 
decision to end the life of a United States citizen that the TARC 
determines to be unreasonable, there is no reason to continue to trust 
that individual to make a similar decision in the future.  
Ultimately, the decision of who to punish, and exactly what 
sanctions should be imposed should be left to the TARC with great 
deference. Congress is in a position to collect data and offer a range 
of civil and/or criminal sanctions that the TARC can choose to 
impose. Or, Congress can leave the punishment decision up to the 
TARC on a case-by-case basis.  
 
H. Appeal Process for TARC Decisions 
  
The appeal process will also mimic the FISA appeal process. 
“Congress vested the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review with jurisdiction to review any denials by the FISC of 
applications for electronic surveillance.”80 Similarly, Congress can 
create a Targeted Attack Review Appeals Court (TARAC) to review 
the decisions of the TARC.81 
Either those who are sanctioned, or the victims, could appeal 
TARC decisions to the TARAC. The TARAC would be staffed by a 
similar group of individuals as the TARC.  It would have three 
members, the same number of individuals as the FISCR.82 It would 
                                                
80 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 U.S. 1138, 1143 (2013).   
81 As a preliminary matter, the constitutionality of the act that creates 
the TARC can be challenged in federal district court.  U.S. CONST., 
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
82 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied. 
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be at the discretion of the TARAC whether to review a TARC 
decision. The TARAC would likely be sparingly used, as the FISCR 
has only convened twice since its creation.83  
The decisions of the TARAC could be appealed to the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Congress could give the 
district court original jurisdiction over the TARAC under Article 
III.84 The court could “review any sealed evidence in camera to 
assure” just cause under the applicable standard.85  
The D.C. Circuit would decide whether the decision was 
made under the appropriate standard, would reverse any decision 
made in error, and if necessary would remand for further 
proceedings. The appropriate standard of review for the appeal 
would be the “some evidence” standard. Although this would not be 
an appropriate standard of proof at the trial level, courts, including 
the Supreme Court, have utilized the “some evidence” standard in 
the past as a standard of review.86 This standard has been primarily 
used “by courts examining an administrative record developed after 
an adversarial proceeding.”87 Because the TARC would require an 
adversarial hearing, this standard is appropriate. As long as there was 
“some evidence” that the TARC and TARAC could rely on, their 
decisions would be upheld. Again, this gives the utmost deference to 
the Government, while still preserving the right to appeal.  
Final review would ultimately rest with the Supreme Court of 





                                                
83 Id. 
84 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
85 In re National Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litigation, 671 
F.3d 881, 904 (9th Cir. 2011). 
86 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004). 
87 Id. 
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VI. Additional Clarifications 
 
A. Concerns Regarding the Right to Due Process 
 
It is important to remember that because the TARC is limited 
to reviewing cases of American citizens, due process concerns arise.  
As discussed above, the DOJ in its White Paper stated that U.S. 
citizenship, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause, do 
not prevent targeted killings from being lawful acts. 88  Whether 
United States courts agree with that sentiment or not has yet to be 
clearly decided. 
The Supreme Court previously addressed a similar issue. In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court held in a plurality decision that 
although Congress authorized the indefinite detention of combatants 
in limited circumstances, “due process demands that a citizen held in 
the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a 
neutral decision-maker.”89 This is because even in cases in which the 
detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains 
the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who 
disputes his enemy-combatant status.90 The plurality went on to hold 
that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an 
enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s 
factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.”91 
                                                
88 Isikoff, supra note 31, at 2 of the White Paper. 
89 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. The Court also states at 528: “this Court 
consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his 
detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without 
recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine 
whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for that detention have 
basis in fact and warrant in law.” 
90 Id. at 524. 
91 Id. at 533. 
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 The case law seems to make it clear that as an American 
citizen, those subjected to targeted attacks deserve a right to an 
impartial hearing. Even though the damage and/or the death may 
have occurred, it seems as though ex ante review would not be 
possible due to national security concerns, and thus this post facto 
review seems to be the only legitimate way to hear the claims of 
those who have been targeted. 
A court will have to conduct a balancing test for procedural 
due process claims.92 Judicial balancing must be done, the alternative 
being blind obedience to the Executive branch. Because, “the threats 
to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review 
are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge 
meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial 
adjudicator.”93 
When it comes to the Government’s efforts to combat 
terrorism, courts have consistently rejected defendants’ claims that in 
camera and ex parte proceedings violate the defendants’ Fifth 
Amendment right to due process.94 “Due process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
                                                
92 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 
903 (9th Cir. 2011). 
93 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. 
94 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d at 
903 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t 
of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (permitting 
reliance upon secret evidence in designating a group as a terrorist 
organization); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 
F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (using classified information in in 
camera and ex parte proceedings to prove that a group is a terrorist 
organization did not violate due process); Global Relief Found. Inc. 
v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (statute not 
unconstitutional because it authorizes the use of classified evidence 
that may be considered ex parte by the district court). 
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demands.”95 In National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department 
of State, the D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 
congressionally approved in camera and ex parte proceedings under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.96  
Another U.S. court held that the “notice ‘need not disclose 
the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to 
the court under the [relevant statute]. This is within the privilege and 
the prerogative of the Executive, and we do not intend to compel a 
breach in the security which that branch is charged to protect.’”97 In 
light of congressionally and judicially approved in camera and ex 
parte proceedings, it is unlikely a court would find this portion of the 
TARC legislation unconstitutional. 
 
B. Shifting Control of Targeted Killing Decisions 
 
In March of 2013, President Obama announced that he may 
be shifting the targeted killing program from the CIA to the 
Department of Defense (DOD). 98  This would actually be a 
significant step forward in terms of accountability and legality. The 
implementation and procedures of the TARC would not change 
                                                
95 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
96 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
97 In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 671 
F.3d at 903 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 
208-09); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (citing Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) in holding that “the process due in any 
given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s 
asserted interest, ‘including the function involved’ and the burdens 
the Government would face in providing the greater process.”). 
98 Rafia Zakaria, President Obama: The drones don't work, they just 
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however. In fact, TARC review would likely meet much less 
opposition and be a more fair proceeding if the DOD authorized the 
targeted killing decision instead of the CIA. 
First of all, the President would have clear, ultimate authority 
over the consequences of targeted killings as Commander-in-Chief.99 
Second, the DOD cannot classify all operations as “covert.”100 And 
finally, the program would be subject to oversight by other branches 
of the government.101 Since the veil of secrecy would be easier to 
pull back if the DOD were responsible for the program, the TARC 
could come to conclusions based on significantly more information 
than it could if the program was still under CIA control. But whether 
the CIA or the DOD runs the targeted killing program, the TARC is 
still a necessary piece of America’s defense program in the minds of 
an ever-increasing number of people, both in the United States and 
abroad. 
However, Congress has halted this change of control.102 Both 
Senate and House appropriators have blocked funding measures 
aimed at transferring control of the CIA's stealth drone fleet to the 
Pentagon. 103  Some lawmakers, including Senate Intelligence 
Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein, who was mentioned 
previously as a possible supporter of the TARC, have also objected 
to the shift of control to the Pentagon based on the CIA’s experience 
with using the drone fleet.104 
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It is clear that the CIA will retain control of the 
Government’s targeted killing decisions for the foreseeable future. 
As a result, the creation of the TARC remains a priority in order to 
protect both the rights and lives of American citizens across the 
globe.  
 
VII. Criticisms of Targeted Attack Review 
  
There are some legitimate critiques of the proposed TARC 
process. However, there are compelling concerns that outweigh those 
criticisms. The most serious concern is that the creation of a court to 
review targeted killing decisions would do more to “normalize” the 
targeted killing program than to restrain it.105 It would show the 
Government that the American people approve of this extremely 
controversial procedure. However, the establishment of the TARC 
would not be a recognition by the American people that they approve 
of the targeted killing of United States citizens; rather, it is an 
acknowledgment of the reality that the Government uses this 
procedure and it needs to be regulated. The establishment of the 
TARC would be the first step in informing the Government that the 
American people do not trust the Government to effectively restrain 
itself in times of war one-hundred percent of the time. 
 Another criticism of creating a targeted killing review court is 
that U.S. courts can handle the claims, and thus the creation of a new 
court is unnecessary.106 However, on April 4, 2014, Judge Rosemary 
Collyer granted a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the Government in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia in a case in which the 
ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights represented the 
estates of three U.S. citizens whom the CIA and JSOC killed in 
                                                
105 Jameel Jaffer, Judicial Review of Targeted Killings, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 185, 185 (2013). 
106 Id. at 186. 
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Yemen in 2011.107 In granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the 
court held that allowing the Plaintiffs to recover “against Defendants 
would hinder their ability in the future to act decisively and without 
hesitation in defense of U.S. interests.”108 But what is interesting 
about the court’s decision is that it never explicitly stated that future 
plaintiffs would experience the same result. In fact, the court held 
that: “Whether Plaintiffs can claim damages against the United 
States is a decision for Congress and the Executive and not 
something to be granted by judicial implication.”109 Thus, at least 
one court seems to imply that if the TARC were to be created, future 
plaintiffs would be able to recover monetary damages if it is deemed 
that they are deprived of their due process rights as a result of a 
targeted killing.110 
 Critics of creating a new court believe that a traditional 
United States court has many advantages over the kind of review that 
would likely take place in a specialized court: the proceedings are 
adversarial rather than ex parte, and the hearings are open to the 
public.111 The TARC would be an adversarial process, as there would 
be a JAG officer representing the plaintiff, but the open proceeding 
aspect is where this argument falls apart. This article has discussed at 
length the nearly unwavering deference given by courts to allow the 
Government significant latitude to claim a need for discretion in 
combating terrorism. It is unlikely that a U.S. court would permit 
national security secrets to become public during litigation.112 
                                                
107 Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 2014 WL 1352452 at 18 (D.D.C. April 4, 
2014). 
108 Id. at 17. 
109 Id. at 18. 
110  Assuming the legislation creating the TARC permitted monetary 
damages. 
111 Jaffer, supra note 105, at 186-87. 
112 See New York Times Co. v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 
2d 508, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (U.S. District Court Judge Colleen 
McMahon held that although the Obama Administration has engaged 
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 Another reason that some individuals believe that a separate 
court is unnecessary in this context is because federal courts 
frequently adjudicate wrongful death claims of citizens killed by law 
enforcement agents.113 However, deciding whether a United States 
law enforcement official acted appropriately is vastly different from 
deciding whether a Government official acted reasonably in his or 
her counterterrorism efforts. That determination requires specialized 
expertise. While a former federal judge can help decide TARC 
claims, those with actual experience fighting terrorism must be 
included in the process in order to fairly judge those accused of 




The TARC is a necessary component in the Government’s 
counterterrorism strategy. It is clear that the TARC is needed in light 
of the recent developments in the War on Terror. Most importantly, 
this article has shown that the TARC could legally and effectively be 
implemented in the United States. This article was written with 
practicality in mind, and can hopefully be a blueprint for the creation 
of passable legislation by the United States Congress. If nothing else, 
it can serve as a springboard for discussion on what can be done to 
protect the rights of United States citizens during the continuing War 
on Terror. Ironically, the Attorney General perfectly encapsulated the 
theme of the TARC in his letter to members of Congress defending 
the Administration’s drone policy when he quoted a portion of the 
following excerpt from the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi: 
 
                                                                                                             
in public discussion on the use of targeted killing against its citizens, 
it has not waived its right to a FOIA exemption). 
113 Jaffer, supra note 105, at 187. 
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“We have long since made clear that a state of war is 
not a blank check for the President when it comes to 
the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”114 
 
 
                                                
114 542 U.S. at 536. 
